UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Southwest Power Pool, Inc.	)	**Docket No. ER24-1317**

Public Interest Organizations' Motion for Leave to Reply and Reply to SPP's Answer to Comments and Protests

May 10, 2024

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Pursuant to Rules 212 and 213 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC" or "Commission"),[1] Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sustainable FERC Project (collectively, "Public Interest Organizations" or "PIOs") move for leave to respond and respond to SPP's April 19, 2024 Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer ("Answer"),[2] in the above-captioned docket.

PIOs stand by and restate the concerns previously raised in the Protest ("Protest") of SPP's proposed Tariff Revisions to Implement Effective Load Carrying Capability ("ELCC") Methodology and Performance Based Accreditation ("Tariff Filing").[3] Nothing in SPP's Answer has alleviated the concern that SPP's proposed accreditation methodologies create a fundamental mismatch between how SPP values thermal resources and the value those resources actually provide to the grid; and perpetuate a longstanding inequity in how the RTO values different resource types.

I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REPLY TO SPP ANSWER

The Commission's Rules prohibit parties from submitting answers to answers unless specifically authorized,[4] but the Commission may waive this prohibition for good cause, and has done so when the filing aids in the Commission's decision-making process.[5] Because there is no provision for parties to file answers to answers, there is also no time limit when any such proposed answers must be filed.[6] Thus, the Commission may consider the timeliness of a

[1] 18 C.F.R. 385.212, 213 (2023).
[2] Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (Apr. 19, 2024), Docket No. ER24-1317-000, Accession No. 20240419-5275 (hereinafter "SPP Answer").
[3] Protest of Public Interest Organizations to Southwest Power Pool's Proposed Accreditation Methodologies for Thermal and Renewable Generators (Mar. 29, 2024), Docket No. ER24-1317, Accession No. 20240329-5474 (hereinafter "PIO Protest").
[4] 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2) (2023).
[5] 18 C.F.R. § 385.101(e) (2023); *see, e.g.*, *Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 178 FERC ¶ 61,249, P 16 (2022).
[6] 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2) (2023).

proposed answer as part of its determination whether good cause exists to permit that answer into the case record. Here, there is good cause for the Commission to allow PIOs' proposed Reply: the Reply is narrowly tailored to SPP's specific arguments in the Answer; it corrects errors of fact and of omission made by SPP for the benefit of the Commission; it promotes an efficient resolution of the issues; and it is timely because it is within the window of the Commission's consideration of SPP's filing. PIOs' Reply will help the Commission's understanding of PIOs' concerns regarding SPP's proposed accreditation methodologies. Thus, the Commission should grant PIOs' request to submit the following reply.

II. REPLY TO SPP'S ANSWER

The bulk of SPP's Answer responds to arguments either made by PIOs directly or substantially similar to PIOs' arguments. As PIOs explain in the following sections, SPP's Answer offers no convincing new rationale to justify its proposal to rely on a flawed metric to accredit thermal resources.

A. Mere "Improvement" over the Status Quo Does Not Render a Proposal Just and Reasonable

As an initial matter, PIOs point out again that improvement over the status quo is not the relevant metric by which the Commission must judge SPP's Tariff Filing.[7] SPP refers to the proposed methodologies as improvements over the status quo throughout its Answer,[8] and cites this improvement as a basis for approval,[9] but these arguments have no basis in the relevant standard for Commission review. The Commission may not approve a new tariff provision

[7] *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 180 FERC ¶ 61,089 at P 47 (2022) ("PJM argues that [Intelligent Reserve Deployment] is an improvement over the all-call approach, but, even if that characterization were true, that does not render this particular proposal to use the largest contingency in the [Intelligent Reserve Deployment] case just and reasonable").
[8] SPP Answer at 4-5, 14-16, 19-21.
[9] *Id.* at 19.

because it is "more accurate" or "more just and reasonable" than what previously existed; instead, it must determine that the proposal is accurate, just, and reasonable. And unfortunately for SPP, this conclusion is simply not possible for SPP's proposed methodologies.

B. The Growing Consensus Disputing the Accuracy of EFORd Accreditation Methodologies Blunts the Relevance of Past Commission Approvals

SPP next argues that the Commission should accept its proposal because in the past the Commission has "[a]ccepted EFORd as a [j]ust and [r]easonable [a]pproach to [c]apacity [a]ccreditation."[10] However, it is well-established that just because a tariff was found to be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory at one time does not preclude the Commission from later finding it to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly preferential–as it is here.[11]

In support of its position regarding the viability of the EFORd methodology, SPP offers examples from two very dated FERC decisions;[12] one of them is twenty-three years old, and the other is seventeen years old. There is no question that significant changes have occurred in the understanding of how accurate and reliable EFORd is in the context of capacity accreditation during that seventeen-year time period, and in particular in the last several years after the recent

[10] *Id.* at 8 (italics omitted).

[11] *See, e.g.*, *Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 123 FERC ¶ 61,169 at P 31 (May 16, 2008), *citing Ameren Services Co. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.*, 121 FERC ¶ 61,205 at P 33 (Nov. 28, 2007) (finding "a tariff provision implementing a particular rate [or practice that was found reasonable at one time] does not preclude the Commission from later reviewing the tariff provision to determine whether it continues to be just and reasonable."); *California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*, 125 FERC ¶ 61,055 at P 97 (Oct. 16, 2008) (finding that the Exceptional Dispatch mechanism accepted by the Commission in a September 2006 Order may no longer be just and reasonable, and expressing concern CAISO's intended expanded reliance on Exceptional Dispatch, and payment structure "may yield unjust and unreasonable outcomes that unduly discriminate against non-resource adequacy resources."); *California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*, 126 FERC ¶ 61,150 (Feb. 20, 2009) (order on Section 206 investigation, accepting new Exceptional Dispatch proposal by CAISO), *on reh'g*, 129 FERC ¶ 61,144 (Nov. 19, 2009); *Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n v. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.*, 116 FERC ¶ 61,069 at P 38 (July 20, 2006) (finding compensation to generators under the must offer obligation "no longer just and reasonable").

[12] SPP Answer at 8 (*citing ISO New Eng., Inc.*, 119 FERC ¶ 61,045, at P 134 (2007); *N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.,* 96 FERC ¶ 61,251, at 61,993 (2001)).

winter storm events.[13] As noted in PIOs' Protest, PJM has specifically testified that "*current* modeling approaches focused on peak load conditions and average performance do not fully capture all of the risks that impact resource adequacy needs and resource performance."[14]

SPP does not reference or attempt to refute the sworn testimony provided from both PJM and MISO specifically asserting that EFORd is neither accurate nor reliable.[15] The best that SPP can conjure is to summarily argue that the testimony provided by other grid operators is "of no moment."[16] This statement is not supported by citation to any authority or testimony; indeed, SPP does not submit *any* sworn testimony to support *any* of its positions, and instead relies on the bare assertions in its pleading. This stands in stark contrast to the expert testimony provided by PJM, MISO, and PIOs in the various capacity accreditation filings. SPP claims that the use of EFORd "is not unusual,"[17] but the RTO fails to acknowledge it would be the only RTO/ISO to use this capacity accreditation methodology once ISO-NE completes its own migration away from this convention.[18]

C. SPP's Final Accreditation Methodology Will Have Significant Impacts on Resource Decision-Making in the SPP Region

One of the stranger arguments SPP raises in its defense of the Proposed Methodologies is that the Commission should not worry too much about SPP's accreditation choices because "SPP does not run a centralized capacity market or otherwise centrally procure capacity resources."[19] In SPP's telling, this fact is relevant because it means resource accreditation processes are "only

[13] *See generally*, PIO Protest at 21-25.
[14] *Id*. at 23 (emphasis added).
[15] *See generally,* SPP Answer.
[16] SPP Answer at 8.
[17] *Id*.
[18] *See* ISO-NE, Resource Capacity Accreditation in the Forward Capacity Market Key Project, (2024), *available at* https://www.iso-ne.com/committees/key-projects/resource-capacity-accreditation-in-the-fcm.
[19] SPP Answer at 9-10.

one of many factors an LRE may consider in deciding in which resources and resource types to invest," and therefore "concerns that SPP's proposed accreditation methods send the wrong price signals are unavailing."[20] As an initial matter, merely in proffering this argument SPP undermines its own (incorrect) suggestions that the Proposed Methodologies are accurate and nondiscriminatory: it suggests that the Commission should be more forgiving of SPP's shortfalls because they won't matter much anyway.

More importantly, this argument is also wrong. Under SPP's accreditation process, LREs are responsible for procuring enough capacity to meet their Planning Reserve Margin Requirement ("PRMR"), which is a function of their projected peak load multiplied by the regional Planning Reserve Margin. The resources LREs may use to meet that obligation are granted a specific accredited value according to SPP's accreditation rules. This means that, although LREs may ultimately decide what resources to invest in, their choices are strictly cabined by the requirements and valuations handed down by SPP. In other words, when an LRE makes decisions about future resource investments, it faces the significant constraint that any mix of resources must enable it to meet its PRMR, and the further constraint that SPP has determined the value it intends to place on each type of resource. As PIOs' Protest explains, giving one resource type an artificially inflated capacity value significantly distorts LREs' resource planning processes in two ways.[21] First, it will force *all* LREs to procure more overall accredited capacity, socializing the cost of resources' poor performance across the system. And second, resource types with inflated capacity values will then inevitably be favored in LREs' investment decision-making processes to meet that obligation. Also, the absence of a central clearing market does not change this dynamic at all: the fundamental question that drives

[20] *Id*. at 10.
[21] PIO Protest at 26–28.

investment decisions around capacity is not the mechanism by which LREs acquire the capacity rights of generation resources; it is the value those capacity rights can bring towards meeting the PRMR.

D. Thermal and Renewable Resources Are Similarly Situated Under Clear Commission Precedent

SPP next contends that it is permissible to treat renewable generators differently from thermal generators because they have different operating characteristics.[22] More specifically, SPP suggests that "variable and conventional resources are not similarly situated."[23] SPP contends, "the resource adequacy contributions of variable energy resources diminish as penetration increases in a way that the contributions of conventional resources do not, justifying different treatment for these differently-situated resource types."[24] This argument badly misapprehends both the Commission's legal doctrine regarding "similarly situated" resources, and the facts as applied to that doctrine.

There are several fundamental flaws with SPP's argument. First, as noted in PIOs' Protest,[25] determining that entities are similarly situated "does not mean that there are no differences between them; rather, it means there are no differences that are material *to the inquiry at hand*."[26] For example, in *Brookfield Renewable Trading & Marketing LP*, the Commission found that pumped storage facilities and battery resources were similarly situated for the purpose of "the inquiry at hand" there, which was participation in the Inventoried Energy Program.[27] This program provided incremental compensation to resources that maintain a certain amount of

[22] SPP Answer at 15-16.
[23] *Id*. at 16.
[24] *Id*.
[25] *See* PIO Protest at 7.
[26] *N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.,* 162 FERC ¶ 61,124 at P 10 (Feb. 15, 2018) (Order granting, in part, and denying, in part, rehearing and clarification, and requiring further compliance) (emphasis added).
[27] *Brookfield Renewable Trading & Mktg. Lp*, 184 FERC ¶ 61,169 at P 3 (2023).

inventoried energy during cold periods when winter energy security is most stressed.[28] While pumped hydro resources and battery resources have differing characteristics and storage technologies, both could meet "the applicable operational requirements" and provide a reliability service for the program.[29] As such, they were found to be similarly situated resources *for the purpose of the Inventoried Energy Program*.

Similarly, with regard to capacity accreditation in SPP, "one MW of renewable capacity that is delivered during a risk period is fundamentally the same as one MW of conventional capacity that is delivered during the same time period."[30] Indeed, proper "accreditation doesn't care 'what you are,' only 'what you can do.'"[31] Rather, what is important is whether the resource has "ability to mitigate risk during tight margin periods or other operationally risky periods."[32] Thus, there is no question here that both renewables and thermal resources are eligible to, and can operationally provide, accredited capacity in SPP market. As such, there is no "specific attribute of solar and wind resources that warrants reducing their accreditation for unit-specific non-performance events while entirely declining to do so for other resources, given that unit-specific non-performance events occur across all resource types."[33]

Second, the assumption that thermal resource adequacy contributions do not diminish as more of those resources are added is simply incorrect. Adding more units with similar operational properties—which share common vulnerabilities to operational failures and thus tend to fail during the same high-risk periods—provides diminishing reliability returns to SPP's system. SPP does not dispute that thermal units have experienced significant correlated outages

[28] *Id* at P 31.
[29] *Id*.
[30] PIO Protest at Exhibit A, 13 (PDF 56).
[31] *Id*.
[32] *Id*.
[33] *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 182 FERC ¶ 61,100 at P 7 (2023) (Clements, *concurring*).

due to these common-mode failures; nor could it, given the ample evidence of widespread correlated gas and coal outages during recent winter storms.[34] Shortfalls in the gas supply system impacted multiple similarly situated gas generation facilities and would have impacted any number of additional gas generators with similar supply issues; and frozen waterways and coal piles simultaneously impacted multiple similarly situated coal generation facilities.[35] These events clearly demonstrate the diminishing capacity returns that SPP should expect to receive from marginal thermal units, and highlights exactly why SPP should adopt a methodology that accounts for correlated outages of all resource types.

Third, even assuming that renewable resources provide diminishing capacity value as penetration increases while thermal resources do not—which is not true—this does not in any way excuse SPP for failing to meaningfully account for correlated outages in its methodology. SPP attempts to wave away the concern that its thermal accreditation methodology does not account for correlated outages by stating that non-performance will be accounted for in the seven-year history.[36] But conspicuously, SPP does not explain whether or how correlated outages are calculated in its proposed accreditation methodology, or how that calculation compares to the parallel calculation in the ELCC methodology. SPP cannot do so because average historic availability data does not meaningfully capture correlated outage risk.

Fourth and finally, SPP misstates PIOs' arguments on undue discrimination. PIOs have never suggested that "employing different accreditation methodologies" for different resource classes is necessarily unduly discriminatory.[37] Instead, PIOs argue that using a capacity

[34] PIO Protest at 17–21.
[35] *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 15-17 (discussing failures in the coal fleet during winter storms).
[36] SPP Answer at 14.
[37] *Id.* at 15.

methodology for one resource class that accounts for an event type that occurs equally across resources classes (i.e. correlated outages) and not accounting for that common event type for another type of resource class, is unduly discriminatory.[38] This is a very different allegation from the strawman argument that SPP has attributed to PIOs. Indeed, PIOs devote an entire section of their Protest to offer several potential alternative methodologies for SPP's proposed thermal accreditation methodology (i.e., "Slice of Day," "Direct-LOL," or modified EFOR), that are different from what is proposed for renewable resources ("ELCC").[39] The allegation that PIOs call for "uniformity" in accreditation methodologies is incorrect;[40] PIOs seek comparable treatment.

In sum, clear Commission precedent and practical considerations both require that SPP select accreditation methodologies that examine the performance of different resource types using equivalent metrics. Those methodologies need not be identical, but they should achieve a similar measurement. SPP's failure to do that here is central to the inadequacy of its Tariff Filing.

E. SPP's EFORd Methodology Does Not Effectively Measure Performance During High-Risk Periods

On the adequacy of SPP's EFORd methodology, the RTO's chief substantive argument is that EFORd is an appropriate methodology for accrediting capacity value because it reflects "performance during all periods, *including high risk periods*."[41] While this statement is technically true, it ignores the dominant position non-high-risk periods have in the calculation. High Risk periods tend to be a tiny fraction of overall hours in a season; in SPP, the high-risk

[38] *See, e.g.*, PIO Protest at 29-37.
[39] *Id*. at 35-36.
[40] SPP Answer at 19.
[41] *Id*. at 13 (emphasis in original).

periods associated with recent winter storms on average have comprised about 134 hours of conservative or emergency operational conditions, which is only 1.53% of the roughly 8760 hours in a year, or 4.61% of their total winter season hours.[42] As PIOs explained in the opening protest, evaluating unit performance across a resource's entire demand period will dilute the signal that is collected on that unit's performance during the high-risk periods when the system most needed its contribution. If failure to perform during the highest-risk periods has a minimal impact on a unit's accredited value, of 1-5% of its total accreditation, no meaningful incentive will be created for that unit to perform better during the system's highest-risk periods.

SPP is well aware of this phenomenon: in fact, it readily admits one perverse result of its own accreditation methodology, which is to better insulate continuously operating generators from the consequences of their underperformance during the RTO's highest-risk periods. As SPP points out, units that are "called upon less frequently (which likely coincides with times of highest need) *and* fail to perform will observe larger decreases in their accreditation value."[43] The inverse corollary to this statement is that resources that are operational throughout the year will "observe [smaller] decreases" from failing to perform during times of highest need. In other words, even within resource types, SPP's proposed EFORd methodology could easily assign a *lower* accreditation value to a high-cost, higher-performing unit (that operates less because of its

[42] Winter Storm Uri was the most significant event, causing 286 hours of impacted operational conditions; Elliot and Gerri caused 50.5 and 65 impacted operational hours respectively. Southwest Power Pool, A Comprehensive Review of Southwest Power Pool's Response to the February 2021 Winter Storm: Analysis and Recommendations, at 25 (Jul. 19, 2021), *available at* https://spp.org/documents/65037/comprehensive%20review%20of%20spp%27s%20response%20to%20the%20feb.%202021%20winter%20storm%202021%2007%2019.pdf; C.J. Brown, December 2022 Winter Storm Elliott, Supply Adequacy Working Group Presentation at 3 (Feb. 20, 2023), *available at* https://www.spp.org/Documents/68837/SAWG%20Meeting%20Materials%2020230222-23.zip (compendium of documents); C. J. Brown, January 2024 Winter Storm Gerri, Supply Adequacy Working Group Presentation at 2 (Feb. 20, 2024), *available at* https://www.spp.org/Documents/71119/SAWG%20Meeting%20Materials%2020240220.zip (compendium of documents).

[43] SPP Answer at 12-13 (emphasis in original).

higher cost but shows up half the time during high-risk periods), than to a low-cost, lower-performing unit (that operates all the time but experiences forced outages during every high-risk period). The incentive this creates is for LREs to cut corners to ensure (including potentially through uneconomic self-scheduling of specific units) that their generation assets clear energy markets often enough to blunt the impact of their failure to perform when SPP has the greatest need for them.

What SPP presents as a feature of its proposed EFORd accreditation methodology is actually a critical flaw. SPP is simply not correct when it claims that thermal resources operating a smaller portion of the year should be judged more directly by their operation during high-risk periods;[44] this statement inexplicably pigeonholes resources into "roles" and ignores the reality that every generator, of every type, should receive capacity accreditation based on an equitable evaluation of its ability to reduce LOL events and ensure that the RTO meets its resource adequacy planning standard of 1 day in 10 years LOLE. While PIOs appreciate SPP's open discussion of the impacts of its methodology, the Commission should not confuse a clearly presented accreditation methodology with a just and reasonable accreditation methodology.

F. SPP's ELCC Methodology Does Effectively Measure Performance During High-Risk Periods

Meanwhile, SPP suggests that the EFORd methodology should be excused for failing to consider the impact of performance during high-risk periods because "the ELCC methodology does not focus exclusively on high risk events."[45] This is simply not true. While ELCC models consider all hours of the year in their evaluations, the models are focused primarily on the high-risk hours in determining accreditation values, as those are the hours where a resource class's

[44] *Id.* at 18-19.
[45] *Id*. at 18.

contribution to maintaining the 1 day in 10 LOLE standard matters most. SPP goes on to note that the "ELCC is designed to reflect the fact that increases in penetration of renewable resources blunts the reliability contribution of individual resources."[46] This is true: as the penetration of wind or solar generation resources increases, the individual value of those units decreases. But that is *exactly because* the ELCC methodology evaluates the fleetwide contribution of such resources to the highest-risk periods. The reduction in ELCC-based accreditation values reflects the reality that as renewable resources form a larger share of baseload power, unusual weather patterns like doldrums and heavy cloud systems will cause more and more of the high-risk periods grid operators will have to manage through.

G. SPP Has Mischaracterized PIOs' Discussion of Performance by Resource Type During Recent Winter Storms

Finally, SPP's pushback on PIOs' Protest includes a clear mischaracterization of PIOs' arguments, which might mislead the Commission. In responding to PIOs' discussion of SPP-created bar charts examining different resource types' performance during recent winter storms compared to their accreditation levels, SPP claims that PIOs' discussion is missing an "acknowledgment that these analyses were performed based on SPP's *existing* methodology for accrediting variable energy resources."[47] SPP goes on to claim that, as a result, overperformance by wind resources during recent winter storms "is not reflective of the appropriateness of SPP's proposed methodology."[48] SPP is simply incorrect that PIOs did not acknowledge that the bar charts' accredited values were based on existing accreditation methodologies. To the contrary, PIOs addressed this exact issue when discussing wind overperformance compared to

[46] *Id.*
[47] *Id*. (emphasis in original).
[48] *Id*. at 20.

accreditation, and even included an explanation why updated accreditation values were not likely to change the analysis:

> While this graphic represents wind's accredited values using SPP's Existing Renewable Methodology, PIOs do expect the accreditation value that would result from SPP's proposed ELCC analysis to be more in line with the existing methodology (the blue bars) than with the average 5-year Available value (the green bars).[49]

If SPP believed that ELCC-based accreditation will significantly increase accreditation values for wind resources, it had ample opportunity to make that point. Its failure to do that, even in an Answer, suggests that PIOs' original assessment of the impact of the new ELCC-based accreditation is accurate. And to clear up another misrepresentation of PIOs' Protest in SPP's Answer: PIOs do not believe and have never suggested that wind overperformance during recent winter storms compared to the proposed ELCC accreditation renders the ELCC methodology improper.

PIOs also addressed the fact that bar charts comparing resource performance to accreditation were based on existing accreditation methodologies in the context of thermal units' underperformance during recent winter storms. That discussion is reproduced below:

> Tellingly, while SPP identifies underperformance by thermal resources compared to their accreditation levels during winter storms as a basis for revising the Existing Thermal Methodology, the RTO makes no effort to show thermal generators' performance compared to what their accreditation levels would have been under the Proposed Thermal Methodology. This omission is glaring: generally, when a problem is identified as a justification for a policy change, some demonstration is made that the change will fix the problem. But SPP's failure to include that analysis makes sense here, because its proposed change will not fix the problem of significant thermal generator underperformance. To understand why, one need only look at the green bars for the coal and gas fleets, which represent the average availability of those fleets during the same winter periods as the occurrence of these winter storms, as measured over the past five years. Average performance over a five-year period is a reasonable approximation of the metric by which an EFORd mechanism accredits resources, making the green bar a reasonable predictor of what the coal and gas fleets' accredited values would

[49] PIO Protest at 35-36.

> have been under the Proposed Thermal Methodology. Thus, the same charts SPP used to explain the inaccuracy of its existing ICAP methodology based on coal and gas underperformance of their currently accredited value, also show that the coal and gas fleets *would still have underperformed* their accredited value even if SPP's Proposed Thermal Methodology were already in place, by roughly 3 GW and 12 GW (still almost half of what would have been the gas fleet's total accredited value) respectively.[50]

Again, PIOs did not simply identify that thermal resource underperformance was tied to existing accreditation methodologies: the discussion also suggested the green bars represent a reasonable estimate of what the proposed methodologies' accreditation levels would have been under SPP's proposed PBA accreditation methodology and demonstrated that thermal units still significantly underperformed that value during times of high-risk. And again, SPP's failure to use its Answer to dispute PIOs' estimation of likely accreditation values under the proposed methodologies suggests that PIOs' estimation is likely roughly accurate.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, PIOs continue to request that the Commission reject SPP's Tariff Filing.

Dated: May 10, 2024.

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[50] PIO Protest at 16 (internal citations omitted).

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this filing has been served this day upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding.

Dated: May 10, 2024.

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